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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

HAWAIIAN

EQUIP~1ENT

COM-

PANY,
Respondent,

Cas·e No.
7188

vs.

THE EIMCO CORPORATION, a
corporation,
A ppel!Jant.

PE.TITION FOiR REHEARING

Comes now the ap·pellant and respectfully petitions
the cou~t to set aside its judgment in the above entitled
cause and to grant a rehearing herein upon the following grounds :
1. That the court has miseonceived the nature of
this action and has decided the case upon a theory not
pleaded or relied upon by the p[aintiff; and that in
adopting said theory the court holds that: there has been
a compliance with the statute of frauds when it affirmaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tively appears, w~thout dispute, that as to the cause of
action pleaded in the complaint there has heen no compliance wi~h said statute.
2. Conceding that a p·arty may be permitted to
recover upon a theory not pleaded or relied upon, the
court neveritheless erred in ~permitting an oral issue of
fact involving such theory to be resolved by the jury when
the statute of frauds ·demands that such issue involving
an ess·ential term of the contract should have been foreclosed by the written memorandum.
3. The cour t has not only imp,aired the effectiveness of the stRtute of frauds (Section 81-1-4) but ~his
decision if adhered to, will utterly destroy it as a rule
of :evidence in this State.
WILLIS V\T. RITTER
JESS. R. S. BUDGE
Attorneys for Appellant
1

CERTIFICATE
W·e, the undereigned attorneys for appellant, do
hereby cer,tify that in our op~inion there is good ~eason
to believe the judgment rendered herein is erroneous
and that the caus·e ought to be re-·examined.
WILLIS W. RITTER
JE.SSE R. S. BUDGE
Attorneys for Appel~ant
ARGUMENT
This court, as a basis for its later dicission, quotes
from Rest,atement of the' Law, Contracts, Sec. 207, to
the ·effect that the memorandum required by the statute
of frauds must state with reasonable certainty:
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3
•' The land, goods or other subject n1atter
to which the contract relates, the tern1s and conditions of all the pro1nises consti~tuting the contract and by whon1 and to \Yhonl the pro1nises
are made,''
followed by the cormnent of the eo1npilers of tha.t volume
that:
The degree of particularity with which the
terms of the contract * * * must be set out cannot be reduced to an exact forn1ula.. There must
be reasonable certainty and there must be accuracy, but the possibility need not be excluded
that some other subjeet matter * * * wil'l also fall
within the words of the writing."
The court then identifies one of the p~articular issues
presented on the appeal, to-wit, the sufficiency of the
memorandum signe·d by the p~arty to be charged. It
concludes that because of--~the familiarity of the parties
with the merchandis·e involved in the transaction, they
understood to what the words ''reference hammers''
related and that parol evidence was admissibJe to ap:pily
the memorandum to the subj·ect matter. The court th·en
holds the memorandum to be sufficient.
We now come to those statements in the opinion
which we £e:el constitute a false basis for the court's
conclusion. Says his Honor, Judge Latimer:
"The p·rinciple that the goods must he identified and the other terms and conditions set forth
with reasonable cer,tainty must be considered in
connection with the knowledge and relationship of
the parties and trade usages to determine whether
the contents of the memorandum sufficiently conveyed to the parties involved an identity of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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subject matter and a reasonabl certainty of the
* * * Th e par t·1es
. ·
other terms an d con d1t1ons.
represented business interests which were familiar with the articles being sold and understood the meaning to be given the words 'hammers' and 'scalHrs '. The use of the abbreviated
phrase 'ref'erence hammers' presupposed some
prior discussion with reference to harnmers.
While the use of abbreiViated phrases may render
the writing unintelligible ito an uninstructed person, the phras-e may still have meaning when
view·ed in the light of circumstances surrounding the· sending of the cablegran1. When this
court scrutinizes the language of the cablegram
it gives the words used the meaning ascribed to
them by rn·erchants who are familiar with their
usage and have occasion to deal with them in the
commercial world. If by giving the words such
meaning the subject matter is intelligently identified and the terms and conditions are fairly disclosed then parol evidence is admissible for a
limited purpose. While this type of evidence is
not competent to contradict or vary th~e terms of
a memorandum to show what is intended, the
situation o.f the parties and the surrounding circumstances at the time the contract was made
may be shown by such proof to apply the memorandum to the subj·ect matter. The cablegram is
not so lacking in details as to amount to a nullity
and when it is interpreted in the light of the surrounding facts and ·circumstances any deficiencies
are supplied and the instrument then becomes
ce~tain in all its terms. The conditions are not
changed or modified; th-ey are explained and the
explanation makes it possible to de~termine fro1n
the cablegram what appellant was offering to
purchase. The -cablegram, even though not a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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model of clarity, 'Yas sufficient to full~r diselose
the essential tern1s of the offer and parol evidence
was admissible for the purpose of ap~plying the
tern1s of the eablegral:\1 to the sale of the hammers.''
Well, if it is sufficien't, there is no memorandumand this is our firm conviction-there is no memorandum
in any case where parties, both of whom are esp:ecially
familiar with the merchandise which is the subject of
the contract, which cannot he sup~plemented by sufficient parol evidence in order to make it enforceable
notwithstanding the statute of frauds. The parties may
have been thoroughly familiar with the words or language used in the business to which their transaction
related; they may even have ·agreed on all the terms of
a contract so that they understood one ano'ther p~er
fectly, but that is not sufficient. The te·rms of their
understanding and all the essential terms must he reduced to writing and sign·e'd by the p~arty to be charged.
In the cablegram, which, in this case, must constitute
the ''memorandum'' required by th;e statute, there is
no statement whatever:
(a) of quantities, kinds or makes of hammers; or
1

(b)

of what is meant by "will take all," 'vhether
all pJaintiff had in S'tock, or all it would acquire, or all it might elect to sell.

Of course we argued this point in our brief, but we
again sugges t it because we cannot believe that this
court wishes to nullify the statute by saying, in effect,
that the knowledge of the p~arties concerning the sub1
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ject matter of 'the ·contract justifies reading into the
memorandum a specific descri:ption of the property supplied by parol, in order to make the memorandum comply with the statute. The court 8-ays that
''The cablegram is not so lacking in detail~
as to amount to a nullity."
What details does it gi¥e1 I1t merely says ''Reference
hammers bid maximum twenty-four dollars each scalers
17.'50 each Honolulu will take all.'' If the court will
please refer to paragraph 3 of the complaint, it will observe that the respondent alleges an ''·agf"!e:ement im,
w·nititng'' for the sale of equipment by qwootity and
d~escription and that it p·artieularly specifies the models
and makes and numbers .of each mo,del and rlvake of both
scaling and chipping hamm·ers which it claims were the
subject matter of the contract. The contract as it is alleged, is the contract upon which respondent relied
and which i t attempted to prove. If th·ere was such a
contract it embraced, of course, a specification of all
these different models and ma~es of hammers and the
numbers of each model and make; and with the ommission of all'these details of the contract, the court, nevertheless, states that it was not so lacking in details that
parol evidence was not permissible to add all these
details to the contract in order to make it enforceable
under the statute of frauds.
For our pr~esent purpose, we may concede that there
was ''p-rior discussion'' ·and 'that the parties understood
the character of merchandis·e which was the subject of
their negotiations. We may concede that they discussed
1

1
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the source from which th·e Inerchandise was to be obtained. We may ·even concede that they specified the
nu1nbers of hammers (although th·e evidence ·does not
show tha;t the numbers talked about corres:ponded with
the allegations in the complaint) but, with all thes·e concessions, ev-en though they n1ight establish the fact that
a contract was made, it nevertheless was not an enporceable contract. The statute of frauds does not say that
persons may not exercise the right to contract by dealings in parol or by dealings partly in parol and partly in
writing, but it does declare that a contract to se-ll goods
of the value of $500.00 or upwards shall not be enforceable by action ''unless * * * some note or memorandum
in writing of the contract of sale is signed by the party
to be charge·d or his agent in that behalf.''
Let us suppose, by way of example, that two liveS1tock men enter into negotiations for the sale and purchase of cattle and after they had dis-cussed the matter
over the telephone, the buyer should telepgraph :
''Reference livestock. Will take all. Steers
Seventy-Five Dollars Heif·ers Sixty-Five Dollars
Calves 'Twenty-Five Dollars.''
Would such a m·emorandum he sufficient to sustain a
complaint wherein it is alleged:
'' 1. That plaintiff and defendafllt entered
into an agreement in writing as follows: That on
or about the ------------ day of____________________,___________________ _
the defendant offered and agreed to purchase
from plaintiff, and on or about the ------------ day of
-------------------------------------------~---------------- the plaintiff acSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cepted said offer and agreed to sell to the defendant certain cattle designated as steers, heifers
and calves for the price and upon the terms and
conditions hereinafter alleged.
'' 2. That the quantity and deseri ption of
said lives tock which defendant agreed to purchase from the plaintiff, as aforesaid, are as
follows:
1

Steers
H ei.fers
50 Durham
25 J·ersey
60 He.reford
40 Holstein
80 Poled Angus 30· Guernsey

Calves
60 Herefords
90 Guernsey
75 Durham

Would such a state of faCJts differ, in principle, from the
facts in the ease~ Would the supposed memorandum
comply with the statute of frauds~ Based on such a
memorandum, could the s·ellei recover for 50 Durham
steers, 40 Holetein heifers, el r.. ~ Could he show by
parol the numbers nf ~ac.h class and kind which were
the subject of the con tract ~ Would the case not fall
squarely within the rule announced in Ellis v. Dentve1r &
Rio Grand R1ailrooad, (Colo.) 43 Pac. 457, where the court
said:
''All agree that the terms of the bargain
must be so stated as to render it possible therefrom to gather what the p·arties have agreed to.
Tested by this very gen·eral rule which is sufficient for our purpose, a simple insrpection of the
memorandum will demonstrate its insufficiency.
We are unadvised hy its terms w·hat nu.mber of
ties ·of the various descrip~tions were agreed t~n
be d,e~ivered b-y the cont.raat'rbng p~arty." (Italics
ours)
1
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Wili the court pleas-e again read this case and Williston on Contracts Rev. Ed. Vol. II, p. 578, an·d other
authorities cited at pages 11 to 20 of our brief, and
see, also Bw.rley ~f}c. C:o. v. Onken Brothe~rs, (Wyo.) 183
Pac. 747.
We most respectfully eontentlthat this court's. statement that ''the ·cablegram, ·even though not a model of
clarity, was sufficient to fully disclose the essentiai terms
of the offe·r and parol ·evidence was admissible for the
purpose of applying the- terms of the cablegram to the
sale of the hammers,'' is erroneous and this court ought
not to ~permit such a construction of the s·tatute to
stand. Can the document in this cas·e be so supplemented
by parol as to ·establish a contract for th~e sale of ·the
particular e·quipment specified in the complaint? Is, it
sufficient to say, and we make this remark with all due
respect to the· court, that
1

1

1

''Although the goods were m·erely described
as 'hammers' and 'scalers' each party in effect
concedes that these terms of the cablegram were
understood by them to refer to 'chipping hammers ' and ' scaling h·ammers ' ' '.
As we have heretoforie remarked, suppose it was
so understood by both parities, was it also understood
that there were 418 model K-1 Inge·rsoll-Rand Comp·any
scaling hammers, 1250 model FC Chicago Pneumatic
Tool Company scaling hammers, 140 model MM Independent Pneumatic Tool Company scaling hammers, etc.,
and also 708 model No. 2 Master Pn·eum-atic Tool Company chipping hammers and 188 model 2 Chicago PneuSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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matic Tool Company chipping hammers' And even if
we should assume· that the words ''chipping harmners''
and ''scaling hammers'' were meant by 'the parties to
include these various models and makes specified in
the complaint, we ar,e, af.ter all, here concerned with
whether there is before the court an enforceable contract unde·r the statute, not with what the parties understood. The only contract prove·d, if respondent proved
a ·contract, is made up of the memorandum and of the
parol evidence specifying the particular descripitions of
the particular equipment according to model, make and
number of ·each. Did not such parol evidence add terms
to the written memorandum in order to make out all the
terms of the contract which shou!ld have been s-et forth in
the memorandum alone~
But this eourt goes. further. To quote:
''The point on which the parties divide i~
the unce~tainty concerning the make, 1nodel and
number of each kind of hammers involved in
the -contemplated purchase. Although the testimony on behalf of the piarties on the question of
the makes involved in the government offering
is in direct conflict, t.he jury resolved the evidence
im f(JIIJor of respondewt wnd found the tools substO!Ybt~ally as repres~ented. The sa.le belitng by lot
rather th(JJ}'b by iVfl)d~"vid!wal descrip1tvon, the evidence oonce:rniln.g identificat~on w·as sufficient to
remove any uncevrtarimty abowt the make or
m01del." (Italics ours)
Of course our contention is that the court should never
have permitted the jury to ''resolve 1the evidence- in favor
of the respondent'' because no enforceable contract for
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the sale of any hammers had been proved. 'That was the
reason for appellant'~ request for a directed verdict.
Furthermore, how can the court say ~that the sale, was
''by lot rather than by individual description'' in face
of the allegations of the complaint which specifically set
forth a contract for the sale of certain goods by a p,ar~
ticular description as to kind, model, make and the number of ·each~ And this contract, as they alleged it, respondent was, of course, bound to prove. This court
would not, of course, intentionally make a misstatement
and it cannot wish to permi t such a misstatement to
operate as the basis for upholding as sufficient, evidenee
by parol of a bulk or lot sale contract when no such contract was pleaded or relied upon. Respondent must stand
or fall on the contract he pleads and which it contends
is enforcible becau~·e all necessary terms are embraced
within the ''memorandum signed by the p arty to be
charged.'' It cannot claim a valid sale by lot. That is
not what it alleged the con tract to be. It is this c:ourt
that advances that theory. If a par'ty should attempt to
change his theory on app~eal, this court would not permi t
it to do so. Crarne v. Judge, 30 Utah 50, 83 Pac. 566.
According to the opinion, the court has changed the
theory for res'Pondent, and, upon the assumption that
the sale was ''by lot,'' holds the evidence of identification
to be sufficient when, as before stated, the plaintiff itself
specifically describes the particular items and kind of
equipment it declares appellant agreed to buy. This
court holds in effect that it was p~roper to permit the
jury ''to resolve this evidence'' (that is, the oral evi1

1

1
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dence) "in favor of respondent'' and thus estabish with
sufficient certainty the models and makes of the equipmen't -so as to give rise to a contract for sale "by lo·t."
If the jury can resolve disp~utes between the parties as
to the identity of the goods, that is, as to ''the makes involved" or as to any other essen tial term of a contract, of
what use is the statute of frauds~ Such an issue was
submitted to the jury at early common law, but it was
to put a s top to the tem·ptation to perjury involved in
trying out such an issue by oral evidence that this ancient
statute was passed. Its purpose was, and is, to put a
s~top to one p~art.y ·claiming orally what goods were sold
by lot or by des·cription and other p~arty claiming orally
the opposite. Tha.t the statute is salutory is evidenced by
the fact that in all English speaking countries, it has
been adopted. We most resp.ectfully point out that the
very fact that an issue of fact relating to an essen tial
term in the bargain exists, is of its~e:lf sufficient proof
that the s\~at,ut;e has wot been comp,lie:d with. W·ether the
goods were sold "as is" or "by lot" or "by description"
should be settled and determined by the writing itself
as an ess~ential term of the contract. It was for this
reason, among others, that we urged upon the court
below that the respondent cannot recover as a matter of
law, since this, a controlling issue in the case~, should have
been s·ettled and determined by the cablegrams-the offer
and the acceptance-and because these writing are
entirely silent on this issue, that deficiency cannot be
suppfLied by making an oral disputed issue of fact out
of it to be disposed of by the jury. For the trial court to
1

1

1

1
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overrule our motion and submit the issue to the jury,
would have been regular in all respects but for the statute, which makes any eontract, all essential terms of
which are not embodied in a m·emorandum in writing
signed by the party to be charged, unenforcible.
We really feel that should a similar case hereafter
come before this court, there would not be an adherence
to 1the doctrine h·ere announced, to-wit, that a plaintiff
may declare, on a written contract of sale and purchase
of specific !JOiods by specifti;c desor~pt~ovn and without any
written memorandum containing any specification of
such goods either by kind, make, model, quantity or type,
may recover on such allegHd contract because both p~ar
ties, being familiar with the particular p~roperty, knew
what was intended and tha:t parol ·evidence may he resorted to supp1ly each and all of the deficiencies in the
terms of the contract. It really makes. no differ•ence how
much information the parties possessed, or that each
knew what the other intended, or whe,ther they in fact
made a contract, the question her:e is did they make an
enfowrceabZe contraet?
1

Then on the question as to whether the acceptance
of the offer was or was not conditional. The court, in
effect, says that becaus.e app~el1ant knew that the p~ro
perty, whatever it was, was to be obtained from government surplus, that fact should he read into 1he memorandum to m.ake it read:
''Reference hammers such as the government
has in its surplus stock, bid maximwn t'ventySponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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four dollars each scalers 17.50 each, Honolulu
Will take all. ' '
or
''Reference hammers, bid maximum t,venty-four dollars each scalers 17.50 each Honolulu
Will take all of which you can secure delivery
from government surplus.''
If such had been the offer (memorandum) then, disregarding for this discussion, the defect as to description
of the property, the reply to respondent ''subject to delivery from surplus'' would have been an aooe1ptance in
the terms of the offer, but when it is necessary to add
to the memorandum by parol such terms of the off·er
as that the proper ty intended compTised a certain number of eertain models and makes of different kinds of
hammers to be delivered to or obtained by respondent
from a government stock pile, it results that two-thirds
of the terms of the contract rest in parol.
We feel that this court has misconceived the character of this action and has given a latitude of construction
to the statute of frauds and its application as to render
that statute meaningless and useless permitting ''surrounding circumstances" to outweigh the sta!tute 's plain
requirements.
We most respectfully urge that a re-hearing should
be granted.
1

1

WILLIS W. RITTER
JE,SSE R. S. BUDGE
Attorneys fovr

A.ppel~wnt
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